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What caused the rise and fall of tech stocks in the late 1990s? I suggest that a
mechanism much like the transactions demand for money drove many stock prices
above the “fundamental value” they would have had in a frictionless market.
During the boom, there was an intense demand for short-term trading in tech
stocks. As a result of market frictions, such trading requires shares of the stock — if
no shares are outstanding, there’s no way to bet one way or the other on the future
of a company. Few shares were available for trading, so the available shares gave
a convenience yield: People were willing to hold them for a little while for short-
term trading, even though they knew that the shares were overvalued as a long-term
investment, just as people will brieﬂy hold money even though it depreciates rapidly
in a hyperinﬂation.
As Ofek and Richardson (2001) document, tech stocks fell when many more shares
became available, due to a combination of IPOs, expiration of lockup periods, and
increasing ability to sell short, while at the same time the speculative demand for
shares mirrored in share volume declined dramatically. As increasing money supply
and declining transactions demand lead to lower interest rates — money less overpriced
relative to bonds — these events sharply reduced the convenience yield of shares.
This paper simply documents the analogy between tech stocks and conventional
money demand. I start with a microcosm, the 3Com/Palm event, and then I extend
the lessons of that microcosm to the Nasdaq / tech stock experience as a whole. I
verify that the elements of a trading-related convenience yield are there in each case,
in particular that high prices are associated with high volume and low share supply.
I conclude with a review of various theories. The key point is that in the tech stock
boom and bust, as in the famous historical “bubbles,” high prices come along with
a trading frenzy. None of the alternative theories says anything about this linkage
— they can predict high prices just as easily with no volume. The convenience yield
inextricably links the price rise and decline with the rise and decline of trading.
This paper is an interpretive review. Most of the empirical work is either taken
directly from or closely inspired by the work of Lamont and Thaler (2001) and Ofek
and Richardson (2001, 2002). My interpretation of the evidence is quite diﬀerent.
2 3Com, Palm and Convenience Yield
3Com and Palm
On March 2, 2000, 3Com sold 5% of its shares of Palm in an initial public oﬀering.
It retained 95% of the shares, and announced that it would give those shares to 3Com
shareholders by the end of the year. Each 3Com share would get approximately 1.5
shares of Palm. (Most of the data and facts about this event come from Lamont and
1Thaler 2001.)
There were two ways to end up with a share of Palm at the end of 2000: you could
buy one share of Palm directly, or you could buy 1/1.5 shares of 3Com. At the end
of trading on March 2, a share of Palm bought directly cost $95.06. 3Com closed
at $81.81, so a share of Palm bought by buying 3Com cost $81.81/1.5=$ 5 4 .54 —a
much lower price for an apparently identical security, and you get the rest of 3Com
for free.
Figure 1 plots daily data on the price of Palm stock and 1/1.5 times the price of
3Com stock. As Figure 1 shows, it was cheaper to buy Palm “implicitly” by buying
3Com than it was to buy it directly through mid-May. The prices in Figure 1 imply
that the rest of 3Com (the “stub”) was valued by the market at a negative amount
— minus 22 billion dollars at the end of the day on March 2. (The sharp drop in
3Com in late July seen in Figure 1 comes on the day that it spun oﬀ its remaining
Palm shares. The market apparently had no problems adding and subtracting on
that day!)















Figure 1: Price of Palm and price of 3Com/1.5 from Palm’s IPO to the eventual
spinoﬀ.
This event seems a clear violation of the law of one price. 3Com should always be
worth at least as much as its holdings of Palm.
This event is an interesting microcosm in which to start thinking about the stock
2market events of the end of the decade. The value of Palm embedded in 3Com is
an easily-measured lower bound on the “fundamental value,” so this event allows us
pretty cleanly to look at a case of a security (Palm) whose price was above such a
“fundamental value.” Then, we can see to what extent the same lessons might apply
to other stocks, and tech or the NASDAQ index, for which “fundamental value”
measures are much harder to estimate.
Similar events, obvious objections.
The 3Com/Palm event was not isolated. Lamont and Thaler document 6 addi-
tional carve-outs with negative stub values in the 1996-2000 period. Mitchell, Pulvino
and Staﬀord (2002) ﬁnd 82 cases in a longer sample in which the implied value of a
p a r e n tc o m p a n yi sl e s st h a nt h ev a l u eo fi t sholdings of a publicly traded subsidiary.
More generally, there have been many puzzling circumstances in which a rapid rise
in the stock price of a partially owned subsidiary does not aﬀect the parent’s stock
price. For example, in 1999 GM had issued tracking stock for its Hughes Electron-
ics unit, and also had a 20% stake in publicly traded Commerce One. (The facts
are from Lamont 2000). Between September 1999 and January 2000, Hughes stock
rose 97 percent and Commerce One stock rose 413 percent. GM’s stock was barely
aﬀected. Lamont cites analyst calculations that this move left GM’s auto business a
price/earnings ratio of only 1.5, at the same time Ford’s price/earnings ratio was 7
and DaimlerChrysler’s was 12. The value of the rest of GM did not fall below zero,
but the frictionless model is on thin ice if we have to assume that shocks to GM’s fun-
damentals are strongly negatively correlated with shocks to Hughes and Commerce
One fundamentals, and uncorrelated with those of Ford and DaimlerChrysler.
These and related observations suggest to many observers that a downward sloping
“demand for shares” is at work. The prices of the available shares are being set as
if the unavailable shares — Palm Shares held by 3Com, Hughes shares held by GM,
tech stock shares held by insiders, etc. — did not exist.
Why aren’t such price diﬀerences arbitraged away? The Lamont and Thaler,
Mitchell Pulvino and Staﬀord and other investigations of these events carefully doc-
ument the institutional details that prevent arbitrage. In the real world, you cannot
costlessly short Palm and buy 3Com shares, in anticipation of your arbitrage prof-
its after spinoﬀ. Short sales require you to borrow stock before you sell it. In the
3Com/Palm case, 3Com stock was often simply not available for borrowing. If your
broker could ﬁnd some, you may have had to pay dearly for the privilege, unlike the
textbook case that you receive interest on the proceeds of the short sale. Furthermore,
if the spread widens, you may be wiped out before the price ﬁnally rights itself. The
short loan may be called, and you may be unable to reestablish the short position —
short loans must be reestablished daily.
In the end though, the fact that it could not be arbitraged away does not resolve
the puzzle. The puzzle is, Why are Palm and 3Com prices diﬀerent in the ﬁrst place?
Who is buying overpriced Palm shares and why? What is the source of the “demand
for shares?”
3All results in ﬁnance are controversial, and this one is as well. One can quarrel
whether it really was an arbitrage. True, fundamental, stub values can be negative.
Though stock is a limited liability security, stubs are not. P ≥ 0 and P + C ≥ 0 do
not imply C ≥ 0. For example, 3Com may borrow, using Palm shares as collateral,
and then go bankrupt. In addition, the spinoﬀ is not 100% sure to happen. 3Com
can postpone it or cancel it (as they can and did advance it from December to July).
3Com may be acquired, and the new parent may cancel the spinoﬀ.N o t e i n F i g u r e
1 the sudden end of the negative stub value, on the day that the IRS approved the
tax-free status of the spinoﬀ. This fact alone suggests that there is at least some
real risk that the spinoﬀ not happen. Mitchell, Pulvino and Staﬀord discuss all the
ways in which apparent negative stub arbitrages can fail to work out, and ﬁnd that
a surprising 30% of their negative stub “arbitrage opportunities” terminate without
removing the mispricing. This story is strained for 3Com/Palm. It’s hard to imagine
that the correct valuation of 3Com less Palm was negative 22 billion dollars in March,
and then recovered steeply to the spinoﬀ in July.
T bills and dollar bills
On March 2, 2000, the one-year treasury bill sold for1 $94.17. A treasury bill is,
of course, a sure promise to receive $100 in a year’s time. One could also get a claim
to $100 in a year’s time by buying $100 directly and holding it for a year. Two ways
of getting exactly the same payoﬀ have a diﬀerent price. Why does anybody hold
an overpriced dollar (Palm) when they could hold a cheaper Treasury bill (3Com)
instead?
We have lots of good stories for this clearcut violation of the law of one price
makes sense. We don’t need an irrational, psychological, or behavioral attachment
to “dollars” rather than “treasury bills” to explain it. People hold money because it
provides “liquidity services” that make up for its poor rate of return. A poor rate
of return is the same thing as a “too high” price. Much of the point of monetary
economics is devoted to explaining “rate of return dominance.”
This analogy is not just creative residual-naming. Monetary economics makes
some quite sharp predictions about when this “mispricing” can occur. If Palm/3Com
is “like” dollars/treasury bills, we must see the standard predictions of money demand
hold true.
2.1 Money-like facts about 3Com and Palm
1. Huge turnover and small short term losses
Nobody holds dollars today as a way of getting dollars a year from now. (Except
drug dealers and so on who value the anonymity of dollars, but the traditional theory
of money demand is the right analogy for stocks). We each hold dollars for a short
1Data from the Federal Reserve H.15 release, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/b/tbsm1y.txt
4time, between trips to the bank and transactions. We’re happy to hold dollars for
these short times, despite the fact that they depreciate relative to Treasury bills,
because we need to hold dollars brieﬂy. Dollars turn over quickly, and as interest
rates rise — as dollars rise in price relative to treasury bills — dollars turn over more
quickly.
Palm turned over quickly. Lamont and Thaler (Table 8) report that on average
19% of the available Palm shares changed hands every day i nt h e2 0d a y sa f t e r
the IPO. The even more dramatic case of Creative/Ubid had a 106% average daily
turnover, and Lamont and Thaler’s 6 cases average 38% daily turnover (Table 8).
Figure 2 plots Palm daily turnover. As you can see, there are many days with huge
turnover. Volume on the ﬁr s td a yw a s1 . 5t i m e st h et o t a li s s u e ,a sp r i c e sf e l lq u i c k l y
from as much as $160 to the $92 close. By comparison, only 4.5% of 3Com shares
were traded every day in the same period, and daily share volumes for typical stocks
are 2% or less. This means that on average, Palm shareholders held the stock for less
than 5 days2, and during peak periods average holdings were much shorter than that!





Palm share volume / shares issued
Figure 2: Palm daily turnover (volume / shares issued). The sharp fall in late July
comes when the remaining 95% of shares are spun oﬀ by 3Com.
Lamont and Thaler conclude that people who bought Palm rather than 3Com
were “irrational” and “just making a mistake.” They could have gotten Palm a lot
2NASDAQ volume includes dealer trades, so one might argue that the correct number is 10 days
rather than 5. On the other hand dealers are people too. More generally, there was surely great
heterogeneity in holding times.
5cheaper by buying 3Com and waiting for the spinoﬀ; a massive version of buying the
name brand rather than the generic. But these turnover rates suggest that few Palm
buyers did, in fact, make that mistake, and the vast majority of Palm shares were
held for very short times.
At a 5 day horizon, holding Palm rather than 3Com is not so obviously stupid.
Take at face value that the Palm share at $95.06 will decline to the implicit $54.54
value from buying 3Com in 9 months. This means a −42.6% relative return over 9
months — pretty bad. But it is only a negative 2/10 percent daily return, or a one
percent negative 5d a yreturn. Now, losing on average 2/10 of a percent as a day
trader, or one percent as a 5-day trader isn’t bright, but it’s much further from idiotic
than the huge loss of buying Palm rather than 3Com and holding it for a year.
Palm stock was also tremendously volatile during this period, with 7.15% standard
deviation of daily returns and 15.4% standard deviation of 5 day returns. The latter
is about the same as the volatility of the S&P500 index over an entire year.F i g u r e
3 plots the distribution of 1 and 5 day Palm returns. Imagine that you are betting
on the movements of Palm over a few days. Clearly the fact that Palm will on
average drift down two tenths of a percent per day is completely drowned out by the
typical movements. Only a small bit of information about the short-term movements
will swamp the information of a -2/10% daily drift down, and make Palm a smart
investment. The drift is a small loss, of the same order of magnitude as the bid/ask
spread, commissions, or the loss from taking a short term rather than long term capital
gain. The Good Housekeeping guide to careful investing warns you to minimize these
losses, but we usually don’t jump to “irrationality” to explain why people are a bit
sloppy about managing small losses, especially when quick decisions can bring such
large gains.
2. Price and volume
A crucial prediction of monetary economics is that velocity increases at higher
interest rates, or as the spread between the value of a dollar and a T-bill increase. As
interest rates rise, people pay more attention to economizing cash holdings, and so
turnover increases. If some sort of transactions demand is behind “overvalued” Palm
shares, then the “overvaluation” should be associated with huge volume.
We already know that Palm’s volume was in fact huge on average. Figure 4 shows
that time variation in Palm volume also lines up with time-variation in Palm’s prices.
(The plot presents a 5 day centered moving average of share volume. Volume varies
enormously from day to day. Prices incorporate expected returns for a long time in
the future; so prices will be associated with longer-run movements in volume. Dollar
volume is the economically more meaningful measure, but I plot share volume to
emphasize that the positive correlation between volume and price does not just come
from a constant share volume multiplied by varying prices.)
A positive correlation between price and volume is not a common stylized fact
of the market microstructure literature. For example, Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen’s




Distribution of Palm  returns
Figure 3: Distribution of Palm daily returns, 2002. The smoothed histogram uses a
normal distribution window with a 2% standard deviation window width.
(1992) comprehensive study lists four stylized facts, starting with the correlation of
volume with volatility, but do not mention a broad-based correlation of volume with
price. It isn’t unknown — for example, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Jones
(2001, Table 2) ﬁnd that high share turnover (and other liquidity measures) forecast
low subsequent returns, which is the same thing as a high price — but it isn’t one
of the most commonly studied eﬀects. The spike in volume surrounding the sharp
p r i c ed e c l i n ei nl a t eD e c e m b e ri sam o r et y p i c a lv o l u m ee v e n t . T h es p i k ei nv o l u m e
around mid-July comes contemporaneous to the 3Com spinoﬀ, and is therefore also
unlikely to be primarily driven by a transactions demand. It is signiﬁcant that a
positive correlation between price and volume does show up. It suggests an unusual
case in which the transactions-based relation between price and volume can stick out
above all the other more usual eﬀects.
3. Arbitrage and short sales constraints
As we have seen, a crucial feature of Palm/3Com was that short selling was at
ﬁrst impossible, then very expensive.
A restriction on short selling is vital to maintaining the dollar/treasury bills spread
as well. Why doesn’t arbitrage remove the price diﬀerence between dollars and trea-
sury bills? The arbitrage is to short dollar bills and buy treasury bills. Alas, you can’t














Figure 4: Palm price and a 5 day centered moving average of share volume.
short dollar bills—printing them is illegal. Printing close substitutes — banknotes, or
small denomination bearer bonds — is also illegal.
4. Share supply and short sales
Money is more overpriced — interest rates are higher — when money supply is lower.
In this context it is interesting that the Palm “overvaluation” happened while only
5% of Palm stock was outstanding, and 95% retained by 3Com. If you wanted to bet
on Palm computers, up or down, you had to compete for one of the very small number
of shares outstanding. (Actually, what matters is the “ﬂoat,” the number of shares
easily available for trading. Many shares are not actively traded or available to be
lent for short even though in private hands. Low ﬂoat can come from a small amount
issued, or from a small amount of a large issue available for trading. Unfortunately,
we don’t have a clean deﬁnition and even less data on ﬂoat.)
Short selling can act like inside money (bank account) creation as a way to increase
the supply of shares. If A lends shares to B and B sells to C, then both A and C have
long positions even though there is only one share outstanding.
Despite the costs of short positions, Palm short sales were massive, increasing
steadily to 147% of available shares in July. That means that on average each share
was bought, lent to short, sold and then half were bought, lent, and shorted again.
(After the spinoﬀ, the total number of Palm shares sold short did not change, but
the supply of available shares jumped so that the fractions returned to normal. Inter-
8estingly, Lamont and Thaler show that parents averaged 3.7% short interest. While
much lower than the subsidiaries, it is a testament to the divergence of opinion on
tech stocks and the emphasis on high-frequency trading that anyone was short the
long end of an arbitrage opportunity!)
Figure 5 plots Palm’s “overpricing” relative to 3Com, i.e. Palm/(3Com/1.5) -
1, against the share supply induced by shorting, 1 + short interest/shares issued.
You can see the nice pattern — as share supply increased, the “overpricing” decreased
steadily.







































Figure 5: Palm overpricing and share supply. “Palm overpricing” is Palm
price/(3Com price/1.5) - 1. “Share supply” is 1 + short interest/shares issued.
It is a little surprising that Palm prices did not fall when the spinoﬀ occurred
and a huge new volume of shares was available for trading. However, this event was
widely anticipated, so the price decline would have to be slow and hard to measure.
The explosion in shorting in July indicates many people expected such a price decline,
and the massive short interest may have gone a long way to providing the required
extra share supply before the spinoﬀ.
95. Poor Substitutes — if you want to trade, you have to trade Palm
There can only be a money premium if money is a “special asset,” if there are no
good substitutes such as private banknotes. There can only be a convenience yield
for Palm stock if there are no good substitutes for the purposes of high-frequency
trading. Are there?
3Com and Palm are poorly linked. The obvious substitute for Palm is 3Com, since
3Com holds 95% of Palm stock. If you want to bet on Palm for a few days, why not
buy 3Com instead and save the 1% negative drift? Surely, any news that impacts
Palm’s prospects will aﬀect 3Com as well.
Table 1 evaluates this option. The ﬁrst row runs Palm returns on 3Com returns.
This is simple, but the two returns may have a spuriously high correlation as they
will both rise when the market rises. The right strategy for betting on Palm is to
hedge the Palm investment with an investment in the market index, for a beta zero
strategy that bets only on Palm’s fortunes. Thus, in the second row I estimate a beta
on the NASDAQ index for each of Palm and 3Com, and then run a regression of the
Palm market model residual on the 3Com market model residual. The bottom set
of rows evaluates the Palm / 3Com return correlation at a 5 day horizon. We know
Palm and 3Com will converge at a 6 month horizon, perhaps the delinking at a one
day horizon disappears by the typical 5 day horizon.
Table 1 shows that buying or selling 3Com is a very poor way of betting on Palm at
short horizons. While the regression coeﬃcients b are gratifyingly close to one, the R2
are surprisingly low, given that all of 3Com’s value (and then some!) is attributable to
its Palm shares. Of the 7% daily Palm volatility and 13-15% ﬁve day Palm volatility,
4.5% daily Palm volatility and 8-10% 5 day Palm volatility are missed by the strategy
of buying 3Com in place of Palm.
bR 2 σ(y) σ(ε)
One day returns:
Palmt = a + b3Comt + εt 0.96 0.60 7.2 4.5
(Palmt − βNasdaqt)=a + b(3Comt − βNasdaqt)+εt 0.93 0.53 6.9 4.6
Five day returns:
Palmt = a + b3Comt + εt 1.03 0.69 15.0 8.3
(Palmt − βNasdaqt)=a + b(3Comt − βNasdaqt)+εt 0.95 0.54 13.4 10.0
Table 1. Regressions of Palm returns on 3Com returns. σ units are daily percent
returns. Sample: 03 March 2000 - 27 July 2000.
Volatility and delinking. Table 1 demonstrates that something really weird (or
really monetary) is going on in the Palm and 3Com valuation. All of 3Com’s value
— and then some — is due to its Palm shares. The only way that 3Com and Palm
returns can diverge is if there is news about the rest of 3Com. But when the stub is
small, it would take astounding volatility of news about the rest of 3Com to account
for the poor correlation between 3Com and Palm shares.
10Here is the argument quantitatively. The value of 3Com should be (if the law of
o n ep r i c eh o l d s )t h ev a l u eo fi t sc o m p o n e n t s :
3 C o mv a l u e=v a l u eP a l ms h a r e sh e l db y3 C o m+3 C o ms t u bv a l u e ( 1 )
Equation (1) implies that the 3Com stub return can be inferred 3Com and Palm
returns by





(value of palm shares held by 3Com)t−1
(3Com stub value)t−1
Palm Returnt
As the stub value declines to zero, any deviation between Palm returns and 3Com
returns implies inﬁnite variation in the 3Com stub return.
Figure 6 shows the imputed 3Com stub return before the spinoﬀ and the actual
3Com return after the spinoﬀ, together with 15 day moving average standard devi-
ations. It’s clear that the “3Com stub risk” before the spinoﬀ is much greater than
the actual 3Com stub risk revealed after the spinoﬀ. The overall standard deviation
o ft h e3 C o ms t u br e t u r ni s3 2 . 2p e r c e nt (daily return!) before the spinoﬀ and only
6.72 percent afterwards.



































Figure 6: Return of the 3com stub (3Com less the value of Palm shares held by 3Com)
before the spinoﬀ and returns of 3Com itself after the spinoﬀ.
At short horizons, Palm prices and 3Com prices are delinked. If you buy 3Com in
order to bet on Palm shares, you are taking on much more than the true risks to the
11stub value of 3Com. You are taking on the risk that when the exact moment comes
to sell, the price move in the 3Com market will be delinked from the price move in
the Palm market. If you want to bet on Palm, you have to buy Palm.
High Frequency Delinking. High frequency traders can’t trade at the closing prices
graphed in daily data, and they spend a lot of time looking at intraday prices, ﬁguring
out exactly when the right time is to buy and sell. Figure 7 shows a very close-up
shot of one afternoon, March 14. (I chose the date at random among days other than
the opening day, rather than select for a pretty plot. The opening day is completely
chaotic.) The Figure presents the NYSE TAQ data of every single trade. There is a
wide trading band at any point in time — good execution is important for day traders!
The ﬁgure also shows substantial lack of correlation between 3Com and Palm. In this
case 3Com is moving around in ways not followed by Palm. From the perspective of
a high frequency trader, 3Com is a very poor substitute for Palm — even though all
of 3Com’s value and more is due to its holding of Palm shares.
Figure 7: Trade by trade prices for 3Com and Palm on the afternoon of March 14
2000.
Options are delinked. What about options? Rather than buy Palm directly or
buy 3Com, why not synthesize Palm with a long call and short put — or just buy the
naked option corresponding to the direction in which you think Palm will go?
Lamont and Thaler (2001) look at options, and ﬁnd massive violations of put-call
parity. The synthetic 3Com stub is almost never negative. The synthetic Palm price
is typically far below the actual Palm price, and does not allow an arbitrage. For
12example, they report in their Table 6 that on March 17, the synthetic Palm was
between 8 and 30 percent (depending on maturity) less than the actual Palm. They
do not report a time series (and I have not yet constructed one), but if the level of
synthetic Palm can be so far away from actual Palm, it seems likely that changes are
also poorly correlated, in the same way that 3Com and Palm are poorly correlated.
If you bet on Palm by buying much cheaper synthetic Palm, when the news you
anticipate hits actual Palm it may not hit the synthetic Palm equally.
6. Why did 3Com Fall?
It’s interesting that on the day of the Palm IPO, 3Com fell 21%. One would
think that the surprising good news about the value of Palm would lift 3Com, since
3Com holds 95% of Palm’s shares. Where is the bad news for 3Com (including 95%
of Palm)?
A convenience yield view gives a reason for 3Com to fall. Until Palm is issued,
the only way to bet on the prospects of Palm is to buy 3Com. The minute Palm
starts trading, however, you can start to bet on Palm by buying and selling Palm
directly. If the day-traders abandon 3Com and head oﬀ to trade Palm stock, 3Com
loses much of its potential convenience yield, its required return rises, and its price
f a l l s .O fc o u r s e ,t h e r em u s tb es o m es u r p r i s ei nt h i ss h i f ti nt r a d i n g .A n yp e r f e c t l y
predictable event should already be reﬂected in the price, leading to a slow relative
decline in 3Com rather than a one-day 21% drop, as the perfectly predictable event
of the actual spinoﬀ did not seem to give a huge decline in Palm. Still, it’s possible
that it was unclear whether the massive pre-IPO trading in 3Com would all move to
Palm, given how few shares would be issued, and that there was some surprise in this
event.
Summary
Table 2 summarizes many of the empirical similarities between the 3Com / Palm
“mispricing” and the Dollar/Tbill “mispricing,” to show the many common features
of the two phenomena.
3Com/Palm Dollar/Tbill
Law of one price violated xx
Restrictions on long-term short x x (no banknotes)
High turnover, short horizon in “expensive” end xx
Turnover higher as price spread higher xx ( v e l o c i t y )
High price security is “special” for trading xx
Price spread higher as quantity lower xx
Price spread lower as substitutes arise xx
Much shorting. substitutes despite cost xx ( c h e c k i n g a c c o u n t s )
Size can be large xx ( h y p e r i n ﬂations)
Table 2. Summary of the similarities between 3Com/Palm and Dollar/Tbill
mispricing
132.2 Making sense of a convenience yield for stocks
Does a trading-related convenience yield for stocks make any economic sense? If so,
can it possibly be large enough to explain events such as 3Com / Palm or the Nasdaq?
2.2.1 Similar eﬀects and the size of convenience prices
T h es i z eo fm o n e t a r ys p r e a d s . While we usually think of interest rates and conve-
nience yields as small, the money/bond price spread has, historically, far exceeded
the Palm/3Com spread. All it takes is a hyperinﬂation. For example, with a 100%
inﬂation rate, the price of a one year bond is 1/2 (I assume a zero real rate to keep
computations simple), so money is overpriced relative to one year bonds by 100%!
And hyperinﬂations of many hundreds and thousands of percent have been common
even in the 20th century. The Palm/3Com spread — arguably one of the largest con-
venience yields in a century of asset price data — is, at about a 50% per year relative
return, mild by these standards.
It may seem strange to think of money as overvalued in a hyperinﬂation, but that
is in fact the case — money suﬀers a high rate of depreciation, so its price today is
“too high” relative to its price tomorrow. People hold a small amount of money,
for a short t i m e ,b e c a u s ei ti si nf a c te x t r a o r d i n a r i l yvaluable in a hyperinﬂation. I
h i g h l i g h tt h ea d j e c t i v e s ,a sa l lt h r e ee l e m e n t ss h o wu pf o rP a l m .
Convenience yields in ﬁnance Transactions-related price spreads and convenience
yields in rates of return are not a novelty to ﬁnance. Of course, the commodity
convenience yield is the heart of commodity futures pricing. Something about having
grain in a warehouse, rather than relying on your ability to buy it if needed, must be
valuable.
Krishnamurthy (2001) documents the spread between 30 year bonds, which are
actively traded, and 29 year bonds, which are not. The 30 year bonds are “over-
priced,” which is explainable by a similar transactions demand or convenience yield
for holding them. As with Palm / 3Com, Krishnamurthy documents short constraints
in the form of a “special repo rate.”
Krishnamurthy ﬁnds the overpricing is typically about 10 basis points. This is
not as small as it seems. Ten basis points for a 30 year coupon bond is about $1.50
per $100 face value. In addition, the 29/30 year yield spread vanishes in a year, so
the expected return spread is about 1.5 percentage points.
Mason (1987) and Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1991, 1993) documents the “bench-
mark” eﬀect in Japanese bonds. Bond traders usually focus on a single issue called
t h e“ b e n c h m a r k ”w h i c hc a nt r a d ea sm u c ha so n ep e r c e n t a g ep o i n ta b o v eb o n d sw i t h
nearly identical terms. When the benchmark changes, the old benchmark declines
in value and the new benchmark gains, in a manner reminiscent of 3Com’s fall and
Palm’s rise when Palm opened. One percentage point on a 10 year (par, coupon, 5%
14yield) bond is an $8 price diﬀerence.
These numbers are smaller than Palm/3Com, but so is bond volatility. Further-
more, we expect that the diﬀerences in opinion or information about the value of
government bonds is much smaller than that for a tech-stock IPO in March of 2000.
Therefore, we expect smaller convenience yields.
Fernald and Rogers (2001) examine the relative prices of the two classes of shares of
Chinese companies that can be held by domestic residents and foreigners, respectively.
Though identical in other respects, the shares available to foreigners have traded for
as little as one-fourth of the price of domestic shares. They also document that the
domestic shares have as much as twice the price volatility as the foreign shares, and
domestic shares average 2.4% daily turnover, compared to 0.3 % for foreign shares. A
natural interpretation is that the domestic share market is where the high frequency
trading takes place, so domestic shares inherit a convenience yield not given to the
foreign shares. One-fourth seems like a lot, but Fernald and Rogers calculate that
the price diﬀerence only translates to about a 4 percentage point per year diﬀerence
in expected return, since stocks are long-lived securities.






reminds us that stocks whose prices are already high, due to high growth g or low
required return r, are especially sensitive to changes in required return. For example,
a stock with r − g =2 %has p/d =5 0while a stock with r − g =5 %has p/d =2 0 .
A one percentage point reduction in required return raises the high priced stock to
p/d =1 0 0while it only raises the low priced stock to p/d =2 5 .B a s e d o n t h i s
simple argument, it at least is not a surprise that convenience yield eﬀects seem most
dramatic among “growth stocks” whose prices are already high relative to book value,
earnings or dividends.
3 Theories of a convenience yield
One’s ﬁrst objection to the T bill/ Dollar bill analogy might be that money is special
because it is the medium of exchange. You don’t use Palm stock to buy your morning
coﬀee. However, the medium of exchange need not have a convenience yield, and a
convenience yield is not limited to the medium of exchange. If every point of sale had
a debt card reader, we could arrange our transactions without holding any money.
Money would lose its convenience yield, even though it remained medium of exchange.
Conversely, bond liquidity spreads, commodity convenience yields, and depreciating
inventories of all kinds remain, though they are not media of exchange.
Money’s convenience yield comes because you have to hold some money as an
inventory, or buﬀer stock. That feature is generated by the medium of exchange
function when markets are not constantly available, but lots of other trading frictions
15can generate an inventory demand.
Trading requires some shares of stock. Obviously, you can’t buy stock if there is
none. You can’t short it either. To short stock, you have to ﬁnd someone to borrow
it from, and then you have to ﬁnd someone to sell it to. You have to hold stock for
a short time in order to short it. Duﬃe, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2001) model these
short selling mechanics. In the model, everyone wants to short. An equilibrium short
rebate keeps each agent happy to hold depreciating stock for the time it takes to ﬁnd
a borrower or a purchaser. The stock price falls slowly as short sales build up.
Scheinkman and Xiong (2002), following Harrison and Kreps (1978), present a
model close to the verbal analysis I have presented. They show how a limited number
of shares plus a large volume of trading based on diﬀerences of opinion can drive
prices up above the frictionless “fundamental value.”
So far, fully-rational models have not derived the extraordinary volume of trading.
Traders say they act on diﬀerences of information, or diﬀerences of opinion (diﬀerent
processing of the same information). Yet every trader can’t have better than average
information. Scheinkman and Xiong rely on “overconﬁdence” — each trader thinks
his signal is more accurate than it really is. Baker and Stein (2002) present a model
based on irrational investors who underreact to news contained in order ﬂow. Their
model predicts that high turnover will be associated with low returns, i.e. high prices.
Other models rely on “noise traders” or other less than fully rational behaviors.
Yet “irrationality” seems a superﬁcial response to the deep problem posed by
volume. Even hyper-rational ﬁnance professors and Nobel Prize winners run to high-
frequency trading when they go oﬀ to Wall Street. Without high-frequency trading,
the NYSE and NASDAQ would disappear, as retail life-cycle investing could not
support them. Do we really believe that the NYSE and NASDAQ are temples to
irrationality — that they would disappear if traders would only take to heart the fact
that we can’t all be better informed than average? Furthermore, when we write
models that make arbitrary behaviors structural, we risk repeating the ill fate of
Keynes’ consumption function and Phillips’ static curve.
I don’t propose to solve the volume mystery here. It seems a productive ﬁrst step
to note that there is a lot of high frequency trading. Let us see trading can induce
a convenience yield and inventory demand for shares suﬃcient to explain puzzling
price patterns, and worry about micro foundations later. If irrational trading,b u t
not irrational valuation, is behind puzzling price anomalies, that is already news.
It may give some comfort to remember that the microfoundations of money de-
mand are also an enduring theoretical puzzle. Obviously, a dollar is helpful in arrang-
ing transactions, but vaguely realistic models of optimal transactions demand do not
come close to the $500 per capita of actual US cash holdings, and even less so the
remaining demand for money in high inﬂation countries. The puzzles are the same
— “why don’t people use foreign currencies, or credit cards?” sounds a lot like “why
didn’t Palm traders use options, or 3Com?”
16A basic theorem of frictionless ﬁnance (essentially, the Modigliani-Miller theorem)
is that the value of the company should not depend on the number of shares issued
to the public. Even if 99% of the shares are locked up, or held passively by some
other company, the total market value should not be aﬀected by the number of shares
publicly issued. The convenience yield violates this theorem; it gives rise to a down-
ward sloping “demand for shares, ” especially in times of huge volume and much high
frequency trading.
4 The Rise and Fall
The Palm/3-Com event is a microcosm of a larger puzzle—the Nasdaq rise and sub-
sequent fall. Price volatility was large, share turnover enormous, short interest large,
and many stocks, and especially many of the unusually highly priced stocks, also had
the curious feature that only a small fraction of total shares were issued to the public.
Did a convenience yield explain or at least contribute to the events? I review the same
suggestive litany of facts in the larger experience.
The “bubble” was concentrated.
Figure 8 compares three indices, the NYSE, the NASDAQ and an index of NAS-
DAQ tech stocks. (The tech index is composed of NASDAQ stocks with SIC code
737. I did not want an index composed of surviving stocks. 737 is the most common
SIC code for stocks on various tech or internet stock indices. This is a narrow index
— for example, it leaves out eBay — but for this purpose it is better to be too narrow
than too wide.)
The ﬁgure makes clear that if there was a “bubble,” or some behavioral overenthu-
siasm for stocks, it was concentrated on Nasdaq stocks, and Nasdaq tech and internet
stocks in particular.
Prices and volume are correlated in time series and cross section.
Figure 9 presents dollar volume for the three indices of Figure 8. The pattern is
clear — both in the time series and in the cross-section, prices are high where dollar
volume is high. (Ofek and Richardson 2001 Figures 1 and 2 present a narrower and
even more dramatic internet index. Their index rises 10 times more than the S&P500,
and shows the same strong correlation with volume as between the ﬁgures here.)
Dollar volume is the economically right measure. A high dollar volume will natu-
rally result from a constant share volume and higher prices. That is still economically
important higher volume, but it is interesting to verify whether this is the case. Fig-
ure 10 veriﬁes that in fact share volume rose and fell as well as dollar prices of a given
share volume.
The association of price and volume is a generic feature of the historical “bubbles,”
though not of most theories applied to them. For example, Figure 11 shows a sur-














Figure 8: Total market value (price × shares) of the NYSE, the NASDAQ, and
NASDAQ stocks with SIC code 737, “computer processing, data processing.” Each
index is based at 100 in Jan 1998. Source: CRSP.














Figure 9: Dollar volume on NYSE, NASDAQ and NASDAQ with SIC code 737.
Series are normalized to 100 on Jan 1 1998.















Figure 10: Share volume on NYSE, NASDAQ and NASDAQ with SIC code 737.
Series are normalized to 100 in Jan 1998.









NYSE index and volume
Figure 11: Share volume (20 day moving average) and NYSE index in the great crash.
Volume is the more voltile series. NYSE index from CRSP; volume from NYSE. Both
series normalized to 1 in 1926.
19prising time-series correlation between the NYSE index and NYSE volume through
the 1929 boom and crash. The graph presents share volume; dollar volume rose and
declined even more calamitously. (Jones 2001 also notes the sharp decline in volume
with the great crash. Jones shows that other measures of liquidity including bid/ask
spreads also declined sharply.) Any value that shares had in high frequency trading
in 1929 had evaporated by 1933. The South Sea Bubble and Tulip bubble similarly
came and went with trading frenzies (Garber 2001).
Cross sectional relation between price and volume
There is also a cross-sectional relation between price and volume. To quantify
this relationship, I run cross-sectional regressions of market equity / book equity
on share turnover. Book equity is an easily available, though imperfect, proxy for
the frictionless fundamental value. Table 3 presents the cross sectional regressions,
and Figure 12 plots the cross-sectional correlation between log market/book and log
turnover at each month. (For a single regression, the coeﬃcient, R2 and correlation
all carry the same information.)
Sample abt FM tR 2 ρ
All CRSP Dec 1999 0.85 0.33 27 0.12 0.34
NASDAQ Dec 1999 0.89 0.38 23 0.13 0.37
All CRSP 1996-2000 (averages) 0.83 0.21 18 7.50 .06 0.24
NASDAQ 1996-2000 (averages) 0.85 0.23 16 7.20 .07 0.27












The ﬁrst two rows present a single cross-sectional regression for December
1999. The second two rows present averages over cross sectional regres-
sions run in every month from Jan 1996 to Dec 2000. t gives the OLS
cross-sectional regression t statistic, and the average of the monthly t
statistic in the second two rows. FM t presents the Fama MacBeth t
statistic, calculated from the time-series standard deviation of the cross
sectional regression coeﬃcients bt dividend by
√
5. ρ is the correlation
between log market/book and log turnover. Book values follow Fama and
French (2002).
Both the ﬁgure and the table show an important cross-sectional correlation be-
tween value and turnover, as a convenience yield predicts. Figure 12 shows interesting
variation over time in the cross-sectional correlation. The correlation is highest dur-
ing the boom year 1999. That is consistent with a positive correlation induced by a
convenience yield sticking out more over the noise, in the year that convenience yield
20was most important to prices. (The plot also shows year eﬀects, due to the once per
year changes in book value. I don’t have a story why changes in book value should
change the cross-sectional correlation so much.)











Figure 12: Cross-sectional correlations of log (market/book) with log turnover. Upper
line: NASDAQ. Lower line: all CRSP stocks.
The regressions also suggest that the correlation is statistically signiﬁcant. The
OLS t statistics in the cross-sectional regressions are large, though the errors are
undoubtedly cross-correlated. The Fama-MacBeth t statistics are also large, even
given the short time dimension of the sample. (Since there is such a strong year
eﬀect visible in the plot, and as a rough correction for the time-series correlation of
the cross-sectional regression coeﬃcients, I formed Fama MacBeth standard errors by
diving the time series variance of the cross-sectional coeﬃcients by 5, the number of
years, rather than 60, the number of months.)
Other predictions for the internet bubble
Ofek and Richardson (2001) survey internet stocks in the late 1990s. In addition
to the strong correlation between price and volume, they document all the other
pieces of the convenience yield picture.
Short sales constraints. In addition to the usual problem that it is diﬃcult and
costly to maintain a long term short position for years, and that you may get wiped
out in the mean time by arbitrage opportunities (Liu and Longstaﬀ 2000), Ofek and
Richardson document the exceptional diﬃculty of shorting internet stocks during the
boom. Rebate rates were low, violations of put/call parity common, as was the case
with Palm/3Com.
21Small number of Shares available Most of the Ofek and Richardson internet index
consists of new companies, and, as with Palm, small fractions of the total shares are
initially available for trading. Insiders are typically “locked out” of selling for a ﬁxed
period, usually 180 days, after IPO.
Price declines when shares become available. One source of “share supply” is
insider sales after lockup expiration. Many observers commented on the puzzle that
prices fell when the lockup period ended, as if the market were assigning value to
traded shares ignoring the presence of shares held by insiders. Ofek and Richardson
(Figure 5) show that internet ﬁrms lost 12% of value (cumulative abnormal return)
from 20 day s prior to the end of lockup to 20 days after the end of lockup. They
document a large fraction of shares removed from lockup between December 1999
and March 2000, coincident with the dot com peak (Figure 4) In addition, to the
extent that traders want to bet on the internet as a whole rather than company-
speciﬁc events, the huge supply of new shares via IPO counts to satisfy the transaction
demand. The total supply of internet shares via IPO, SEO, and insider sales grew
rapidly to a peak in March 2002, just as the price peaked as well (Figure 5).
5 A comparison of theories
What theories account for the curious behavior of tech stock prices? How many of
the facts do they capture? Table 4 summarizes.
Fact Theory
123456
Prices rise, decline xxxxxx
Prices do not forecast earnings xxxxx
Long term short diﬃcult xxxx
Large dispersion of opinion xx
Price high with number shares low (ts & cs) xx
Price high with high volume (ts & cs) x
Price high with volatility high (ts & cs) x
Biggest in growth stocks x
Table 4. Summary of theories and which facts they account for. 1: Frictionless
model driven by earnings expectations 2: Frictionless model driven by risk premia.
3: Rational Bubble 4: Irrational valuation 5: Optimists’ opinions only with short
restrictions. 6: Convenience yield, shares are needed for high frequency trading.
“ts&cs” stands for “time-series and cross-section.”
221. Frictionless rational pricing — high earnings
The standard model of frictionless pricing, for example the simple Gordon growth






can generate huge price rises if people expect huge earnings growth g.T h ei n t e r n e t
was surely a once-in-a-generation technological novelty; a discovery on a par with the
automobile or the computer itself. Couldn’t prices have risen on rational expectations
of earnings growth?
Many observers noted that the earnings growth required to support internet val-
uations was astronomically high. While ﬁne on a story-telling, qualitative basis, this
theory is diﬃcult to match quantitatively. We now know that these observers were
right. However, being wrong, once, is not the same thing as being irrational.W a si t
irrational to believe that the internet was a much bigger thing than it turned out to
be?
Rational expectations can’t be wrong all the time. If this time high prices were
disappointed (so far) by ex-post earnings growth, at some other time, high prices
must have been underestimates of even better earnings growth. In fact, the lessons
of the volatility test literature starting with Shiller (1982) and the return forecasting
l i t e r a t u r es u c ha sF a m aa n dF r e n c h( 1 9 8 8 ) ,i st h a tb ya n dl a r g eh i g hp r i c e sc o r r e s p o n d
to lower future returns, not to higher earnings growth.
In addition, the association of price movements with volume, scarce shares, short
restrictions and so forth are just coincidences to this theory. That volume was high
is as irrelevant as that the sky was blue.
2. Frictionless rational pricing — low returns
If not high g, perhaps low r is the explanation. If earnings grow at 5%, all it takes
is a 5% required return to generate an inﬁnite price. Absent an arbitrage opportunity,
a time-varying risk premium can be invoked to explain any price pattern.
Fluctuations in the market as a whole might be sensibly understood as a time-
varying risk premium. The top of the largest economic boom in postwar US history
is exactly when you’d expect a risk premium to be low and stock prices to be high.
This view is also completely consistent with the volatility test and return regression
evidence — high prices are followed by low returns, and low returns can be perfectly
rational. (Campbell and Cochrane 1999 is one model of this eﬀect.)
Alas, while this story can easily explain procyclical variation in the market as
a whole, it is much more strained to explain a boom in one particular segment of
the market. Why should internet stocks suddenly have a much lower risk premium?
This would have to come from a dramatic change not in overall risk aversion and the
market premium, but from a dramatic change in the perceived covariance (beta) of
internet earnings with respect to fundamental risk factors such as consumption, the
23market portfolio, and so on. And then after March 2000, that beta changes back
again. This is a hard story to swallow.
This model is also silent on a number of empirical regularities. Like all frictionless
models, the huge volume of trading and the association with scarce shares are again
irrelevant.
3. Rational Bubbles
A “rational bubble” occurs if everyone rationally holds stocks for any ﬁnite number
of periods, but the “transversality condition” at inﬁnity does not hold. For example,
a stock with no dividend could satisfy
pt+1 =( 1+r)pt + εt+1.
The expected return is (1 + r), yet the price is not zero even though there are no
dividends — the present value formula is violated. The price is expected to grow
forever. Since we know the world will end in a few billion years, this model requires a
small bit of irrationality — you’re counting on someone, someday, buying an overvalued
stock. However, that irrationality is pushed arbitrarily far in the future.
Rational bubbles can produce fascinating price paths with booms and crashes.
They also produce price volatility that does not forecast earnings or returns. Rational
bubbles require a short constraint, otherwise you would short the bubble, pay any
dividends and turn an arbitrage proﬁta ti n ﬁnity into an arbitrage proﬁtn o w .
However, though “bubble” has been invoked to explain everything from tulip
prices, the South Sea company, the 1929 Dow and 2000 tech stocks, this model is also
silent on many common features of the events. Volume, again, is the most notable.
In a “rational bubble” it is always rational to hold the stock for a period. There is
no reason ever to buy or sell. It is also silent on all the other characteristics listed
in Table 3. There is no reason the bubble should happen in tech stocks and not coal
stocks, and no reason that “share supply” should seem to matter to prices.
4. Irrational valuation
Many observers including Lamont and Thaler conclude that this event is prima
facie evidence for “irrational” investors, who simply put too high a value on Palm.
The trouble with this explanation is that it can explain too much. If prices were
too low, they would be labeled “irrational depression” rather than “irrational exuber-
ance.” (And they have — most of the time the ﬁnance profession struggles with the
equity premium puzzle that prices seem too low leading to too high average returns.)
The strength of any theory is the number of things it can’t explain. I look forward to
the day that behavioral ﬁnance can document structural patterns of behavior toward
risk, well-understood evolutionary responses to our two million years of avoiding lions
on the plains of Africa, that serve poorly in ﬁnancial markets and can explain speciﬁc
puzzles and not others. That day is not with us yet.
As with the other theories, irrational valuation is silent on many crucial attributes
of the experience. Above all, volume: If investors were irrationally attracted to Palm
24and bought too high, why did they get irrationally disgusted a day later and sell?
Why did investors become irrationally attached to tech stocks and not coal stocks?
Why did irrational attraction come and then go? Why did they lose their irrational
attraction when insider’s lockup periods expired?
One of the key deﬁnitions of “irrational” behavior, is that people recognize it
when it’s pointed out and change; education can overcome irrationality. This is
one of the few ways to separate “irrationality” from just plain mistakes, or limited
processing ability, and to give it some non-tautological content. The dog is not
irrational for failing to short Palm; when the mistake is pointed out she just wags
and pants as before. Yet the 3Com / Palm was widely noted in the business press
(and at the GSB faculty lunchroom) on March 2, 2000; the overpricing was no secret.
Similarly, story after story about how internet stocks were “overpriced” from the point
of view of long-term investors appeared in the business press. People bought anyway,
but not for the long term as the volume numbers show. Many ﬁnance academics
were actively trading internet stocks — apparently, the best education in the world
is not suﬃcient to overcome the desire to trade. Lamont and Thaler and Ofek and
Richardson both document that institutional ownership was a little lower than usual
in internet stocks, but “educated” institutions still held large amounts. Thus, we
cannot explain Palm/3Com or the Nasdaq by educable irrationality.
5. Short constraints mean we can’t see the pessimists
Ofek and Richardson (2001) interpret their ﬁndings as evidence for models in
which short sales constraints keep the pessimists’ views from being expressed, as in
Miller (1977). Chen, Hong and Stein (2001) also advocate this view. This view also
generates a “demand for shares.” In particular, as stressed by Ofek and Richardson,
it explains the concentration of high prices in stocks with few shares outstanding.
However, this view is again silent on volume.
Of course there is some blurring of categories here, especially given the number
of models currently being explored. Models such as Harrison and Kreps (1978) have
some trading; their speculative demand comes from the possibility that an even more
optimistic investor will come along, and then today’s optimist will sell to him. Rather
than categorize papers, it’s more productive to categorize the underlying stories. One
story focuses on the fact that with short constraints we don’t see the pessimists. This
story does not fundamentally involve any volume; we can all wake up the next morning
and see the same thing with no trades happening. If one adds changes in opinions or
changes in traders, some volume emerges and, potentially, some even higher prices.
6. Summary
Table 4 summarizes the facts and theories. All of the theories explain prices that
rise and then decline. Only the convenience yield theory says anything about volume.
The convenience yield theory can only explain high prices if there is a restriction on
the number of shares or substitutes and a large trading volume. All of the other
theories are silent on this observation; high volume is a coincidence.
256 Concluding Remarks
A substantial convenience yield or liquidity premium for stocks that are undergoing
a trading frenzy, based on wide dispersion in opinion about a fundamentally new
technology, is an attractive explanation for the high prices of Nasdaq tech stocks
around 2000. This view not only explains the rise and fall of prices, which many
stories do, but it explains — indeed it requires — a wide variety of features common
to this and similar experiences, including the association of high prices with high
volume, high volatility, short sales frictions, and small numbers of available shares.
The possibility that some component of stock prices represents a trading-related
convenience yield can help to explain a number of puzzles related to observations that
demand curves seem to slope down at times. Among the most obvious, it suggests the
long-run underperformance of IPOs (e.g. Loughran and Ritter 1995), following the
Palm pattern on a more subdued scale. It suggests trading-related price anomalies
such as the S&P 500 inclusion eﬀect on prices (Harris and Gurel, 1986; Shleifer 1986)
and betas (Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler 2002): given the large number of index-
linked contracts, stocks in the index will be traded a lot more than stocks out of the
index.
The possibility of stock convenience yields is also interesting for policy and invest-
ment management. Obviously, buy-and hold investors and institutions should avoid
stocks with high convenience yields, or lend them when short rebates make it prof-
itable to do so. If convenience yield induced price distortions are substantial, fewer
restrictions on trading and short-selling, and better substitutes such as individual
stock futures markets can be important in limiting stock price volatility, and helping
stocks to send the proper signals about physical investment rather than share issue.
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